Making Russia a better neighbor
LAST SUMMER, the Council of Europe issued a report urging Russia to cease treating ''neighboring and other countries in the region as zones of special influence." The report urges Russia to ''constructively contribute to resolution of open issues and cease with activities . . . which undermine the countries' sovereignty and territorial integrity."
A key message from President Bush to President Vladimir Putin should be that Russia's own integration into the world, a highly desirable objective, is jeopardized if at the same time the Kremlin has a policy of undercutting democratic development along its borders.
It's unlikely that there's a Kremlin master plan guiding Russia's actions toward her neighbors. Instead, Russia's actions are driven variably by ambition and nostalgia, confusion or misinterpretation, irritation or resentment.
And Russia's policy toward the former Soviet republics varies -- it's manifested in different ways and it produces different results. The Baltic States today are confident of their independence and sovereignty, but they remain afraid of Russia. Baltic leaders and Ukraine claim that Russia uses energy to assert leverage, by having Russian concerns acquire key elements of their energy sectors.
Ukraine and Belarus are themselves contrasts between striving for independence and extreme dependency. Ukrainian President Viktor Yuschenko has been clear about the goal of Ukraine's membership in the European Union. But he realizes the vital importance of not estranging Russia and has taken steps to develop dialogue with the Kremlin, even after Russia shut off gas supplies on Jan. 1. By contrast, Belarus remains a dependency where democracy demonstrations in the lead-up to the March 19 presidential election have been brutally crushed.
In the Caucasus and Moldova, Russia has tried to readjust the orientation of her neighbors, with little success. In 2002, Russia told Georgia to end its political and security relationship with NATO, and urged Georgia to accept Russian bases for the long-term. In Central Asia, dictators who previously resisted closer cooperation with Moscow have been encouraged by the Kremlin's urging to be heavy-handed with any signs of religious revival. Only Russia and China endorsed the Uzbekistan government's killing of hundreds of demonstrators in Andijon last summer.
There are signs that Russia is adjusting to new realities. In Georgia, Russia accommodated itself to Georgian central control over Ajaria and helped with the removal from Georgia of separatist leader Aslan Abashidze. In 2005, Russian and Georgian authorities agreed to troop withdrawal with a timetable and benchmarks, and ended their demand for financial compensation. But there are potential loopholes through follow-on pacts, and Russian troops and arsenals in Georgia may be redeployed to Armenia -- alarming Azerbaijan.
It's in Russia's interest, and in America's, for there to be greater trust and cooperation between Russia and her neighbors. The United States should strive to get Russia to understand that it is not pursuing a policy to transform the region into a zone of American control through ''color revolutions." Instead, what's been happening there is part of a process of what's been happening in Europe for more than 50 years.
At the same time, countries in Russia's neighborhood need reassurance that the United States is committed to their independence, integrity, and stability. The lack of Western reaction to Russian meddling made some new democracies worry that their sovereignty is entirely subordinate to other key US interests with Russia.
In the near-term, the upcoming Belarus presidential election provides an important test. Today Belarus is one of the most repressive former Soviet republics. Last week, police beat and detained Alexander Kozulin, an opposition presidential candidate. A new law pushed through Parliament last year makes organizing a public protest -- or making statements that discredit the state -- punishable by three to five years in prison.
Symbolizing solidarity with the opposition, Bush met recently with the widows of two Belarusan leaders who were murdered by Alexander Lukashenko's government. But as Western governments develop a strategy in the event that international monitors report electoral fraud on March 19, it must be remembered that Lukashenko's major financial and political sponsor is Putin.
In the long term, the West might consider a more dynamic vision of its relationship with a democratic Russia. As the Russia task force of the Council on Foreign Relations recommends: ''Western leaders should also diversify their political contacts within Russia. It's not enough to meet with representatives of 'civil society.' Open and routine contact with opposition political figures and organizations carry a more potent message." Doing so would give credibility and consistency to Bush's freedom agenda.
Mark Brzezinski, a Washington attorney, was director of Russian and Eurasian affairs on the National Security Council in the Clinton administration. 
