Report spells out FBI's missed opportunities before Sept. 11
The IG faulted the FBI for not knowing about the presence of two of the Sept. 11 terrorists in the United States and for not following up on an agent's theory that Osama bin Laden was sending students to U.S. flight training schools. The agent's theory turned out to be precisely what bin Laden did.
''The way the FBI handled these matters was a significant failure that hindered the FBI's chances of being able to detect and prevent the Sept. 11 attacks,'' Inspector General Glenn Fine said.
When the bureau did discover the presence of hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar in the United States shortly before the attacks, ''the FBI's investigation then was conducted without much urgency or priority,'' the report concluded.
The five missed opportunities in regard to the two hijackers stemmed from information sharing problems between the FBI and CIA and problems inside the FBI's counterterrorism program.
The report gave an hour-by-hour description of how CIA and FBI agents assigned to the CIA's bin Laden unit on Jan. 5, 2000, reviewed incoming cables containing a substantial amount of information about Mihdhar, including that he was traveling and that he had a U.S. visa. According to internal e-mail traffic cited by the report, the deputy chief of the CIA's bin Laden unit never gave the necessary approval for disseminating the information about Mihdhar to the FBI. Less than two weeks later, Mihdhar was in California.
The CIA shares information with the FBI and other agencies through Central Intelligence reports, or CIRs, and such a document was drafted about Mihdhar on Jan. 5, 2000, at the CIA by an FBI employee working at the spy agency's bin Laden unit. The deputy chief of the bin Laden unit and a CIA desk officer who was following the issue told investigators ''they did not recall the CIR, any discussions about putting it on hold or why it was not sent.''
''When we interviewed all of the individuals involved with the CIR, they asserted that they recalled nothing about it,'' the report stated.
The report, a year old, is only now being released because of a court fight with lawyers for imprisoned terrorist conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui over how much of it should be disclosed. The report's findings mirror other investigations by Congress and an independent commission into why the U.S. government failed to thwart the attacks.
Without elaboration, the report faults the bureau for a lack of public candor.
''Shortly after the attacks, the FBI indicated that it did not have any information warning of the attacks,'' the report said. ''However, information was soon discovered that had been in the possession of the FBI and the intelligence community before Sept. 11 that related to the hijacking of airplanes by extremists or that involved the terrorists who committed the Sept. 11 attacks.''
The bureau said it has taken substantial steps to deal with the issues the IG raised.
Today, ''no terrorism lead goes unaddressed,'' and new policies are in place to share information among intelligence agencies, the FBI said.
The report was especially critical of the bureau for not knowing about the presence of two of the 19 hijackers who were living openly in San Diego in 2000 and who ''should have drawn some scrutiny from the FBI,'' the report said.
The two Saudis, al Hazmi and al Mihdhar, rented a room in home of a longtime FBI terrorism informant, and they also befriended a fellow Saudi who had drawn FBI scrutiny in the past.
If the focus of the FBI bureau in San Diego on counterterrorism and al-Qaida had occurred earlier ''there would have been a greater possibility, though no guarantee, that Hazmi's and Mihdhar's presence in San Diego may have come to the attention of the FBI before Sept. 11,'' the report said.
The head of the San Diego FBI office responded that the report greatly exaggerates the possibility that local agents could have prevented the attacks.
The informant identified the two men to his FBI handler only by their first names, and the report criticizes the handler as ''not particularly thorough or aggressive'' in following up.
The two men also befriended Omar al-Bayoumi, a Saudi who had established himself in the area. The FBI briefly investigated him in 1998 when the manager of his apartment complex reported that al-Bayoumi had received a suspicious package, had strange wires in his bathroom and hosted frequent weekend gatherings of Middle Eastern men. The FBI closed its inquiry the following year, a decision the report found appropriate.
The IG also reviewed the FBI's handling of Moussaoui, who was in custody before the attacks. Those portions of the document were deleted because Moussaoui, who pleaded guilty in April, faces a sentencing proceeding next year that will put him on trial for his life.
Associated Press writer Seth Hettena in San Diego contributed to this report.
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